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ABSTRACT ■ How robust is coordinated decentralization in socio-economic
governance, especially in wage bargaining, when national economies are torn
between internationalization on the one hand and decentralization or
increased internal diversity on the other? How should the national state
influence the behaviour of trade unions and employers’ organizations? What
constitutes an effective public policy towards industrial relations? Are there
any general design principles for such policies? These are the questions that
we seek to answer in this article, mainly using the Dutch consultation
economy as our example.
Introduction
Until recently, the Dutch socio-economic governance system (the
‘consultation economy’) received much international praise, but doubts
now prevail. The economy suffered badly during the recent recession and
unemployment rose very fast, though it is still at a relatively low level by
international standards. The Dutch themselves have again started soul-
searching, as they did during downturns in the early years of the 1980s
and 1990s. There is disagreement about how responsibilities are best
divided between the government and employers and trade unions — the
so-called ‘social partners’. Accusations that the consultation economy
delays decision-making and erodes the ‘primacy of politics’ have again
surfaced. Lastly, there are different views on how far the government
should devolve its tasks to market organizations and how it can still retain
responsibility and be held accountable in vital areas of public policy and
public services. As a result of these disagreements, policy approaches
have shifted with every twist and turn of the political and economic cycle,
particularly with respect to social security, active labour market policy
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and the work–life balance. The result is that institutional arrangements
and policies frequently change, leading to doubts about the trustworthi-
ness of the government and the legal certainty of its measures.
The Netherlands is a test case for two major issue developments in
socio-economic governance: the limits of ‘organized decentralization’
and ‘state weakness’. Trends in industrial relations and, more particularly,
in wage bargaining during the past two decades can be described as a
prime example of ‘organized decentralization’ (Traxler, 1995). Punctuated
by two major central agreements, Wassenaar in 1982 and the ‘New
Course’ in 1993, responsibility for wage setting was devolved, first, to
sectors and some major multi-plant corporations behaving like sectors
and, second, to firms within sectors. These agreements allowed the
government to retreat and the central organizations to define policy
agendas rather than outcomes (Van der Meer, 2004; Visser, 1998). Central
coordination was retained, but gradually loosened so that lower-level
bargainers and sometimes even individual workers were offered a menu
from which to choose their options. Explicitly centralizing elements such
as the price indexation of wages or the linkage of public-sector wages to
private-sector agreements were removed. Consolidation of this process
through formal and informal coordination within and between the
central organizations (not always at national level or in the public eye)
and the good employment results attributed to the resulting policy of
wage moderation served to keep the government out of wage setting.
Thus, a de facto modicum of Tarifautonomie was gained by the Dutch
social partners, reversing the situation which had existed since 1945.
In recent years, the question has arisen as to whether the government
needs more control over wage determination in order to achieve social
policy reform and cost containment with an ageing workforce — also an
issue in other European countries, especially after Economic and
Monetary Union (Calmfors et al., 2001; Hassel, 2003). Has organized
decentralization run its course? Do recent conflicts, only resolved by a
series of last-minute tripartite ‘emergency’ pacts (in 2002, 2003 and 2004)
entail a new mode of governance? These are the questions that we address
in this article. We begin with a brief summary of the role of the govern-
ment in Dutch politics, followed by an evaluation of the workings and
functions of the consultation economy. The middle section develops a
conceptual framework for steering and governance, in particular with
regard to the role of the state and public policy. In the final section, we
apply this to Dutch industrial relations and consider some more general
implications.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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The Role of the Government in the Dutch Consultation
Economy
In the traditional Dutch neo-corporatist system, the government is
willing ‘to share public space’ (Crouch, 1993) with organized interest
groups in preparing and implementing public policy. But what is the
optimal division of responsibilities between central and local government
and between the government, social partners and market organizations?
Those who have debated this issue (parliament, the cabinet, political
parties, the Social and Economic Council (SER), the Social and Cultural
Planning Office (SCP) and the Netherlands Scientific Council for
Government Policy (WRR)) tend to agree that the government should be
a reluctant interventionist and that interventions must be motivated by a
well-defined public interest.
As agenda-setter, legislator, employer and law enforcer, the govern-
ment evidently plays a key role in the system of industrial relations in the
Netherlands. In 2000, questioned by a former union leader in the upper
house, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment lamely replied that
the division of responsibilities between government, social partners and
related advisory bodies varies from one policy issue to the next. Compar-
ing recent legislation, his conclusion was that ‘there is no uniform, strictly
defined, consistently reasoned demarcation between the parties’ respon-
sibilities’. In an official memorandum presented to Parliament in 2001,
the cabinet admitted that it had no criteria for when or how to intervene,
conceding that governments should always be obliged to offer good
reasons, ‘not only to Parliament, but also to the social partners’. Rather
than list specific criteria, the memorandum ended with three questions,
as follows. Is it in the public interest to achieve a certain objective? Does
serving this public interest require government intervention? What form
should such intervention take? This reflects disagreement about the
potential role of the state in industrial relations after two decades of
gradual disengagement and uncertainty.
In the international literature, state ‘weakness’, understood as a lack of
prerogative or capacity to intervene in industrial relations, economy or
society, has sometimes been understood as an advantage, creating the
incentives for private interest groups such as unions and employers’
organizations to take responsibility and, provided they are properly
organized, to adopt ‘public-regarding’ policies; the successes of the ‘semi-
sovereign state’ of (West) Germany were portrayed in this light (Katzen-
stein, 1987). But in a recent review of this thesis, Streeck (2003) argues
that when structural changes in the economy and internationalization
require major adjustments that tend to harm at least some of the interests
of well-organized groups, ‘state weakness’ has become a liability. Since
Dutch wage bargaining has moved in the German direction, though with
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much less well entrenched trade unions, we may well ask whether the
self-imposed weakness of the Dutch state in industrial relations (the
outcome of two decades of organized decentralization and gradual state
withdrawal supported by all major political parties) has become a liabil-
ity. Have we reached the limits of organized decentralization?
In the Dutch economy, coordination between the government and the
social partners in industrial relations is commonly understood to have at
least three functions. In the first place, it is supposed to improve ‘macro-
flexibility’, allowing wages to respond to the changing conditions in the
(international) economy in order to prevent sharp rises in prices and
unemployment. During the past 15 years, the verdict on Dutch corpo-
ratism has been rather positive, especially when judged by the lowering
of the ‘equilibrium rate’ of unemployment (Hartog, 1998; Van Ours,
2003). However, at particular points in time (for instance, during the
European Monetary System currency crisis of the early 1990s and again
after 11 September 2001) critics have argued that the responses of wage
bargainers have been too slow. These critics are typically torn between
advocating further decentralization (to firm level) and resolute action by
the state.
The second function of the governance system is to prepare social and
economic legislation and assist in regulation. The government, for
example, regularly consults the tripartite SER and the bipartite Labour
Foundation (StAr) or the Council for Work and Income, as well as
various other bodies, when preparing legislation. The SER is involved in
some 40 major pieces of advice each year, prepared in innumerable
committees with the involvement of the social partners, civil servants and,
mostly in the chair, council members appointed by the crown.
Third, the parties alert one another to socio-economic trends and work
together to interpret and evaluate such trends in order to define common
problems and joint policy responses. Based on a highly institutionalized
structure for policy inputs, in which the Central Statistical Office and the
government’s forecasting institute (Centraal Planbureau) play a key role,
this approach favours an expert-oriented, interest-neutral, problem-
solving approach. The role carved out for the social partners is to redefine
problems and solutions in a way that is acceptable to them and relay these
definitions and solutions to their members, thus creating improved
conditions for implementation.
Governance and Steering: Capacity and Need
Let us take a step back and discuss some major principles of governance
and steering. Where should the state come in and how? Is it possible
to derive some general principles? A policy or intervention is called
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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effective when it achieves a desired change in a situation considered to be
a problem. Mayntz (1995) reminds us that programme designs for effec-
tive policies should consider the interaction between the target popu-
lation, its self-organizing capacities and the problem at hand. The state or
public actor is rarely faced with a non-organized mass of citizens; even
where it has the legal power to raise taxes or impose sanctions, its creative
powers are quite limited, and will usually depend on cooperation with
powerful private actors and interest groups.
‘Governance’ is a relatively new concept denoting non-hierarchical
elements and the participation of private interests and actors in the
formulation and implementation of public policies (Rhodes, 1997).
According to a well-known definition, ‘governance implies that private
actors are involved in decision-making in order to provide collective
goods and that non-hierarchical means of guidance are employed’
(Héritier, 2002: 3). This definition applies to industrial relations and most
socio-economic policy-making. Neo-corporatism is one particular type,
with highly structured access to public policy, regular (non-hierarchical)
patterns of interaction and rather monopolistic and in any case, broadly
representative interest organizations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979).
Mayntz (2004) has pointed out that the older concept of ‘steering’
focused on the state as actor, whereas ‘governance’ is more about the
institutions of private–public coordination. In the ‘steering’ literature, the
key question involves the tension between state capacity and the need for
intervention. Theories of steering and governance tend to assume that
actors are interested in and that governance institutions are designed for
solving collective problems. In her view, such a ‘selective knowledge-
interest in problem-solving and its conditions may be warranted, but
only to the extent that one does not by definition assume that politics is
always about resolving collective problems and not — also or primarily
— about conquering and maintaining power’ (Mayntz, 2004: 7–8).
Steering theories risk neglecting power, whereas governance theories find
it difficult to avoid the traps of functionalism.
In discussing particular design principles of coordination and public
policy intervention, it is necessary to keep these warnings in mind. As in
the Dutch debate over the ‘primacy’ of markets, society or politics,
choices for policy design are often ideologically motivated. The neo-
liberal market view, for instance, aims to minimize state intervention and
to constrain private actors as little and state agencies as much as possible,
because it trusts the one and distrusts the other. From this follows a pref-
erence for regulated private production over public provision, for incen-
tives over regulation and for financial sanctions over subsidies (Scharpf,
1979). In the Netherlands, such preferences gained support during the
1990s in all political parties.
Drawing on Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 72), we hypothesize that
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effective socio-economic governance of the neo-corporatist type requires
a high degree of societal self-organization, characterized by broadly
encompassing and concentrated interest groups which are in some power
balance and a high degree of institutional integration or co-authorship
with the state. This can be defined as a state which is powerful and self-
assured enough to accept and recognize powerful social groups as co-
decision-makers. When needed, the public actor is capable of accepting
good advice or imposing restraint. Where the state is weak and interest
groups strong, the state tends to be ‘colonized’ and corporatism will be
at the expense of outsiders; where interest groups are weak or fragmented
and the state is strong, the state will impose its solutions and take away
incentives for self-organization; where both are weak, markets rule freely
at the expense of the weak.
Mayntz and Scharpf (1995), who use a slightly different categorization,
describe three interaction patterns between ‘state’ and ‘society’. In the
first, each actor, while anticipating the actions of others and reacting to
their policies, follows its own course in the pursuit of its own interests,
restrained only by its own power resources relative to others. Under such
conditions of ‘strategic interdependence’, stable outcomes are unlikely. In
Dutch industrial relations, this was the characteristic situation of the
1970s, at the time dubbed the ‘transaction economy’ (Reynaerts, 1985):
each actor tried to make the best deal for itself even when making things
worse for all. In the second pattern, the actors accept that binding
decisions may be made in the public arena, provided that each actor has
sufficient opportunities to influence public decision-making and final
decisions are based on broad and inclusive coalitions rather than deter-
mined by narrow political majorities or particular ideological prefer-
ences. This is the state-directed, hierarchical (if not paternalist)
corporatist model that characterized Dutch industrial relations and wage
setting in the first 15 years after the Second World War (Windmuller,
1969). In the third pattern, private and public actors develop a common
understanding of their situation, usually in the face of an uncommon
challenge (for example, a crisis or Economic and Monetary Union), and
adopt joint problem definitions and policies. Although rare, this outcome
is according to Mayntz and Scharpf (1995: 27), sometimes observed under
the conditions of societal corporatism, a state which possesses credible
sanctions and a jointly understood challenge. It has been argued that after
1982 and throughout the 1990s, Dutch industrial relations came close to
this pattern (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).
We argue that the capacity for state intervention and macro-corporatist
coordination has diminished. This reflects globalization, the loss of
autonomy for Europe and the liberal, market-making bias in the
European integration process since the 1980s; and growing individualiza-
tion, diversity and complexity of economy and society. Lower rates of
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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organization, especially on the side of the unions, are matched by more
diversity among the interests they represent, and a stronger tendency to
express and recognize such diversity, also and especially among employ-
ers (Streeck and Visser, 2005). The failure of the experiments with
communist command economies and the ascent of neo-liberalism as the
dominant philosophy have further weakened political aspirations ‘to
steer society’ as well as the legitimacy of such aspirations.
Acknowledging the weakened capacity of state and societal actors, we
suggest some pragmatic criteria for coordination and intervention. Policy
coordination may help prevent undesirable outcomes, for example unem-
ployment, excessive income inequality or widespread poverty, and may
help create conditions for the production of public goods which markets
fail to deliver, for example training and education. We propose two
additional criteria for defining the nature of state intervention: the diffi-
culty of the issue and the (perceived) risks for outsiders (those without
decision rights, for instance future generations or the unorganized).
Many issues are multifaceted and complex in nature, and their defi-
nition may change over time or depend on conflicting interests. It is a
relatively simple issue that motorists exceed the speed limit and endanger
themselves and others; a more complex problem is that the increasing
volume of traffic creates congestion and pollution. The latter requires
accommodation of a much larger set of interests and knowledge of a
much larger number of variables, ranging from the prediction of levels
and type of economic growth and the daily and weekly patterns of
division of work, care and leisure to the estimation of individual needs
and preferences regarding mobility. Policy-making approaches must vary
accordingly.
If an issue is well understood and can be described more or less
precisely, the government can help by bringing the relevant parties
together to seek a solution, assure that it is not at the expense of those
not represented, and help coordinate the policies of private actors in
attaining these solutions, for instance by providing incentives or sanc-
tions. Another role for the government may be to set clear targets and
substantive goals. If the nature of the issue is not fully understood, and
if the government and other main parties therefore have major difficulties
obtaining the information they need, decision-making is more complex
and depends on a learning process. It may be desirable to bring in new
expertise, try out small-scale, intermediate solutions and engage in local
experiments. Learning should be reflexive, question existing understand-
ing and objectives and encourage participation. Here, the government’s
role is defined not in substantive, but in procedural terms: in helping to
define tasks, specify and monitor timetables and procedures and in guar-
anteeing access.
The second consideration for policy coordination concerns the likely
Van der Meer et al.: Adaptive and Reflexive Governance
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external effects of unconstrained actor choices. Where the interests of
outsiders, who cannot represent or defend themselves, are affected in a
major way, there is a much stronger reason for state intervention than
where such negative external effects are absent or minor.
Four Types of Steering
Applying these two distinctions we draw a simple two-by-two matrix
(see Figure 1). We illustrate this with references to European and national
policies and then use it as a baseline for discussing the limits of decentral-
ized coordination and state intervention in industrial relations.
The north-west quadrant defines a situation in which the issues are
relatively well defined, but the risks of policy failure are considerable,
with large potential damage to outsiders. Here, we argue, the emphasis
should be on ‘steering by objectives’ or adaptive governance, with a clear
role for the government to set targets, provide guarantees that a solution
will be found and impose sanctions if private or lower-level actors fail to
act. If solutions have to be found through negotiations, as is likely in the
domain of industrial relations, it is essential for the government to cast a
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1993), for instance by threatening sanc-
tions or withholding services, goods or legitimacy. In the national
context, one might think of the role of the state in wage bargaining, even
in a relatively decentralized setting, at least when existing solutions and
coordination patterns are challenged by new (international) develop-
ments. In the context of the EU, one might think of the Stability and
Growth Pact, which imposes limitations on the fiscal policy of member
states. As this example shows, however, hierarchical controls and the
threat of sanctions are not necessarily effective or credible.
In the north-east quadrant, the risks for outsiders are seen to be large,
but the issues and solutions are complex and not well understood.
Steering takes place best via comparison, by applying benchmarking
techniques and statistical ranking of cases. In the national context, one
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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FIGURE 1. Policy Alternatives, Issues and External Effects
Issue and general Issue and general
solution more or less solution complex and
understood not understood
Major risk to outsiders Steering by objectives Steering by comparison
(adaptive governance) (open coordination)
Minor risk to outsiders No steering Steering by procedure
(subsidiarity) (reflexive governance)
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can think of policy making and policy coordination in the domain of
quality criteria, ISO norms and the work environment, where local
conditions call for different solutions, but where people require protec-
tion against their own mistakes and those of others. An international
example is the EU Lisbon agenda, which requires policies for a sustain-
able path to growth, productivity, innovation and employment. Also
here, steering by comparison seems called for, but at the same time the
state, or in this case the Treaty and the Commission as its guardian, must
set clear targets and timetables, define rules for participation and provide
guarantees for outsiders. The open method of coordination (OMC) is a
case in point: it may be a solution for mutual learning and joint target-
setting, but only when strengthened by legislation and political commit-
ment, which in the EU context includes the application of the
‘Community Method’.
When such procedural constraints are more strictly applied, we move
to a situation of reflexive governance, which is located in the south-east
quadrant of Figure 1. Here we deal again with complexity and lack of
understanding or information, but risks to outsiders tend to be small. In
this case, the role of the state may be smaller and concentrate on
procedures for access, participation and quality of decision-making. We
call this situation ‘steering by procedure’, reflecting the legal distinction
between substantive and procedural law (Teubner, 1983). Reflexive rather
than adaptive learning, about means and ends, should be encouraged, in
part by widening participation. This can, for example, be realized
through decentralization and integration of labour market and social
security policies within experimental settings at local level, in order to
study the effectiveness of reintegration policies for several target groups.
Other policy examples, in both European and national contexts, may be
working-hours arrangements or health and safety, which are likely to
require different solutions depending on a host of individual, household,
group and organizational conditions. As the risks to outsiders or to the
community are small, there is only need for minimum rules against (self-)
exploitation provided that decision-taking rights are guaranteed.
We can compare the difference between substantive and procedural
regulation with the distinction between mandatory, semi-mandatory and
‘semi-semi-mandatory’ law applied in Dutch social and labour law. In the
first case, the legislator lays down clear standards and offers individual
employers and employees, or their representatives, no room for devia-
tion or negotiation. In the second (drie-kwart bindend recht), the legis-
lator provides some scope for deviation of the standard through collective
bargaining, with derogations permitted under conditions defined in the
collective agreement and hence under control of the negotiating union or
employer organization. In the third case (vijf-achtste bindend recht), the
legislator extends the scope for deviation to the enterprise level and
Van der Meer et al.: Adaptive and Reflexive Governance
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beyond the control of unions or employers’ associations: if a subject is
not covered in a collective agreement, individual employers and works
councils, or other workplace representatives, may make their own
arrangements.
An example at European level can be found in the 1994 European
Works Council Directive, which applied ‘fall-back’ or ‘last-resort’
provisions, stipulating a set of minimum provisions for a multinational
company which failed to agree arrangements on employee information
and consultation. Any arrangement also had to meet standards defined in
the Directive and be approved by employee representatives who were
deemed to have a mandate and in a position to bargain freely.
In the south-west quadrant, risks are small and the issues well defined
and understood. There would seem no reason for government interven-
tion or coordination at higher levels. In other words, the conditions for
‘subsidiarity’ tend to obtain. In the EU context, this means that member
states are free to design and implement policies as they see fit; in the
national context, such a rule might apply to firms, unions, particular
groups or even individuals. A typical industrial relations example might
be profit-sharing.
The Conflict over Modes of Governance in Dutch
Industrial Relations
In the remainder of this article, we illustrate the four policy alternatives
with examples from Dutch industrial relations.
When a substantial policy problem needs to be solved and general
support for a possible solution appears, the government can invite social
actors to discuss the means that need to be employed: steering by objec-
tives. This occurred in Dutch industrial relations in the aftermath of the
economic boom period of the 1990s: the competitive advantage in terms
of unit labour costs appeared to be eroded and the problem of an ageing
workforce and the need for retrenchment of public finance came to the
top of the political agenda.
What adaptive instruments could be used? After the 1982 Wassenaar
agreement, the Dutch government abstained from direct intervention in
wage determination by management and labour. Admittedly, the 1987
Wage Act permitted government intervention in the event of ‘one or
more accumulating economic shocks’, but this was never applied.
Another instrument, the 1992 Adjustment of Minimum Wages Act,
linked statutory minimum wages and benefits to the ratio between
benefit recipients (including pensioners) and those in employment; if the
ratio exceeds 84.6 percent, the government may suspend adjustment in
full or in part, as happened between 1992 and the 1995 (Visser and
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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Hemerijck, 1997). In 2003, when the ratio had improved significantly
because of increased employment, the government wanted to change this
to 70 percent in order to curtail minimum wage rises and benefits. The
unions cried foul and had the law on their side. So, none of these instru-
ments was used for an adaptive response.
Lacking proper tools for adaptive governance and being generally
unprepared, the first and second Balkenende cabinets made last-minute
coercive interventions in 2003 and 2004, announcing major cutbacks in
social protection, in unemployment, sickness and disability insurance and
a curtailment of early-retirement pensions, while at the same time
lowering public spending on labour market policy, employment subsi-
dies and health. It offered to soften some of these measures if unions were
prepared to reduce their wage demands, preferably to zero. This put
employers, who endorsed most of the government’s reform measures, in
the back seat. In 2002 and 2003, tripartite agreements were reached,
curbing wage demands in return for moderation of the government
measures. This explicit form of adaptive steering, however, failed in May
2004 after negotiations broke down, mainly over the reform of disability
schemes and early-retirement pensions, especially the government’s
insistence that individual employees should be allowed an ‘opt out’ from
collective schemes through individual ‘life-course’ savings schemes.
When the unions announced that they were abandoning wage modera-
tion, the government retaliated by announcing that it would no longer
give collective agreements binding effect if they increased wages or went
against government policy. The successful and united mobilization of the
unions, culminating in the second-largest demonstration since the Second
World War, convinced the government that nothing could be gained from
putting the unions in a corner. Another tripartite pact was concluded,
with major concessions from the government in exchange for ‘very
restrained’ wage increases in 2005.
This story shows the limits of state intervention when decision-making
is decentralized, even individualized, and collective bargaining takes place
on the basis of strong and sometimes rigid procedures and norms. These
make it difficult to respond expediently to new situations, and govern-
ments have few instruments to change behaviour other than by issuing
big threats, which are bound to make things worse before they get better
if they do. This deepens rather than smoothes the cyclical swings in the
political economy of neo-corporatism. In short, the system encourages
institutional drift (in good times) and emergency measures (in bad times).
An alternative, in our view, might have been the joint adoption and
annual revision of thresholds for (higher) employment participation and
(lower) welfare dependency as beacons for wage bargaining, as intended
in the 1992 law on minimum-wage adjustment. Another creative
response might have been found in the creation of buffers in social
Van der Meer et al.: Adaptive and Reflexive Governance
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insurance and pension funds during good times, following the well-
known Finnish example (Calmfors et al., 2001). But the temptations of
tax reduction and lower premiums proved too strong for political parties,
unions and employers, saddling the economy with impoverished govern-
ance and the need to play safe when it is least helpful.
When a problem and its possible solutions are more or less known and
the external effects are small, the government can abstain from steering.
Profit-sharing is an issue that prima facie meets this criterion; any
company can decide about the economic participation of its employees
in the ownership of the company, in financial shares, obligations, bonuses
and benefits. At this point, no government steering is necessary. In corpo-
ratist countries, however, the distribution of benefits and direct and
indirect wages is constrained by strong norms of ‘responsible wage-
setting’ and ‘equality’, which are defended by trade unions and political
parties. In the Netherlands, such hallmarks are always mentioned in the
policy documents of the StAr.
When the economy opens up and international companies enter
national markets, the principles for the rewarding of international
management start to shift. The new orthodoxy predicts that top manage-
ment is to be recruited in international networks, is facing new targets,
responsibilities and associated risks, which implies that management’s
compensation should be upgraded to international standards. In the
economic boom of the late 1990s, and in line with the Dutch process of
wage differentiation that emerged after the ‘New Course’ accord of 1993,
this process resulted in unparalleled wage growth of 20–60 percent for
international leaders and top managers.
According to the Dutch employers’ association, self-regulation is the
solution. In 2003 and 2004, they invited the Hay Group and Towers
Perrin to study basic salary, actual and target bonuses, total cash and
long-term compensation and concluded that on average these are well
below international standards. However, after several accounting and
share-option scandals in major companies, there were growing demands
to improve corporate governance. In 2003, the Tabaksblat committee
(chaired by a former company director) was established to study the
principles of good corporate governance and best-practice provision, and
recommended stricter control of company management and reward
principles according to the ‘comply or explain’ principle. In 2004, these
principles were given legal backing.
The new code of corporate governance has not ended the controversy: in
2005, the rewards of top management in utility companies and state welfare
agencies were widely denounced as unacceptably high. Prime Minister
Balkenende advocated ‘naming and shaming’ for this ‘moral deficit’,
provoking indignation by the employers’ associations, which claimed that
the current corporate governance code allows such practices and accused
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the government of undermining the Dutch entrepreneurial climate. We
conclude that the absence of government steering in this example restricts
the scope for regulation, both through normative considerations and
because of corporate governance protocols which are backed by law.
When a policy problem and its solution are unclear and the external
effects are substantial, a combination of adaptive and reflexive govern-
ance is demanded: steering by comparison. An application of this prin-
ciple can be found in the area of childcare provision, which is now a target
in the European employment strategy and a subject of the OMC (Rubery,
2005). This is an important employee benefit, and is crucial in a part-time
economy such as the Netherlands, where hourly wages, employment
conditions and social security provisions are similar for part-time and
full-time workers. In 1990, a Stimulation Measure for Childcare was
introduced, which defined the provision of these services as the joint
responsibility of employers, employees and the state. In 1995, the govern-
ment introduced the ‘combination scenario’ as the standard norm for
social policy, according to which both men and women should be able to
combine work and care equally (Bleijenberg, 2004).
Under such conditions, childcare provisions cannot be left to the
market alone, since the costs will be too extensive and quality standards
cannot be guaranteed. Staff qualifications, safety standards, working
conditions and the pedagogical regime for children must all be regulated.
The interests of outsiders are thus important, though the ideal nature of
the provision is unknown, given the different preferences of citizens
during particular periods of their life cycle.
In 2005, the Childcare Act was changed, putting more financial respon-
sibilities onto employers and individual employees. The first evaluation
shows that since then, families have made less use of the available child-
care facilities and that parents have looked for alternatives in their own
extended network of relatives. Because of the exodus of clients, many
nursery staff have been made redundant, and the human capital of
employees who have withdrawn their labour supply is eroding. We thus
believe that in this policy field, government steering can best take the
form of systematic comparison and definition of minimal price and
quality standards, with tax support for families with lower and medium
incomes so as to guarantee wide access to this common good.
One area of policy that is potentially risky for employees is that of
work and rest periods; here, steering by procedure is appropriate. The law
protects employees against unhealthy and unsafe working hours, and
adaptive governance therefore seems the most likely approach at first
glance. However, the actual substance of the issue (how enterprises and
their employees wish to, and do, deal with work and rest periods)
depends on the preferences of those on the shop floor, which cannot be
precisely grasped at central level.
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For this reason the government, in its policy and legislation, deliber-
ately pursued a strategy in the 1990s that allowed greater scope for decen-
tralized consultation. Its purpose was to acknowledge that individual
employees and enterprises had many different needs and preferences; the
Labour Act (Arbeidswet, 1919) was therefore replaced by the Working
Hours Act (Arbeidstijdenwet) in 1996 (Wilthagen, 1995). This provides
for a relatively complex, dual-standard system: on some issues, it sets out
fixed standards, while on others, it allows scope for consultation between
employers and employees. The social partners at sectoral or enterprise
level play a key role in this system: by concluding agreements on a
particular policy cluster (working hours, night work, Sunday work, rest
periods and breaks) the social partners make it possible for the employer
and works council or other forms of employee representation to inter-
pret the fixed standards within that cluster more loosely. The Labour
Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring the most liberal statutory stan-
dards, while the social partners have a civil-law obligation to enforce the
fixed standards themselves.
In this sense, the Working Hours Act is a good example of reflexive
governance, although it has adaptive features. The law ensures that the
standards for work and rest periods can be adapted to fit in with the
outcome of consultation between the social partners at sector and enter-
prise level (reflexive element). The government, however, has set the
bandwidth (adaptive element) in terms of basic protection norms. The
step-by-step procedure (the bargaining partners must first state their
views on a particular policy cluster, and only then do the individual
employer and works council or employee representation join in) provides
a coordinated approach to decentralization. The trade unions and
employers’ associations exercise control, and decentralization does not
extend all the way down to the shop floor.
An evaluation of the Act (Mevissen et al., 2001) has shown that both
the sectoral bargaining partners and employers and works councils or
employee representatives at enterprise level were fairly conservative
when it came to introducing more liberal working hours, making only
limited use of the scope provided by the Act. This confirms that a large
measure of self-imposed unanimity exists in sectors, despite growing
diversity and the unmistakable signs of decentralization. While the study
found that the Act did not give rise to major problems, it also revealed
that works councils and employee representative bodies do not function
as effectively as they might. Some employee representatives are poorly
informed about the Act and also fail to look critically and proactively at
management proposals. The representativeness of some employee bodies
is questionable, and more than a third of employees surveyed complained
about problems related to working hours at their company. However,
as Tros (2002: 67) argues, correctly in our view, ‘these problems
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cannot . . . be solved by returning to uniformity and centralized control.
In many cases, no practical alternative is available.’
In 2004, the government suggested extending weekly working hours.
Using our own terminology of adaptive governance, the government
could invite the social partners to advise on the results to be achieved
through new regulation. In addition, it would do well to adhere even
more closely to the basic principle of reflexive governance, and to encour-
age employees and their representatives to participate more actively in
policy-making wherever possible. The government is currently also
deliberating a much more radical deregulation of working hours, ques-
tioning more fundamentally its role in this area. The interesting question
here is whether the government does indeed think it is safe to rely on
subsidiarity or will more gradually increase the reflexive element of the
regulation of working hours at the expense of the adaptive element.
Conclusions
In this article, we have discussed the difficulties of socio-economic
governance in a small, open and decentralized economy, which is facing
a need for justification and accountability of its outcomes, while
confronting the challenges of both internationalization and differentia-
tion of decision-making. We have suggested that there are several co-
ordination strategies that may keep governments and social partners on
their toes, varying in their degree and type of coordination. In Dutch
wage bargaining during the ‘boom years’, not many of our examples seem
to have worked in a satisfactory way. Wages ran out of control while the
means of social policy reform became highly contested; corporate
governance failed to match international standards; childcare provision
became unaffordable for many families; and protection through the
revised working-hours regulation is again under debate. Complacency
was probably the strongest attitude and instruments that worked in the
past were not updated.
Yet under what theoretical preconditions can the four forms of govern-
ment steering lead to more effective and legitimate outcomes? In all
strategies, government steering includes a role for interest organizations
in the field of industrial relations. In the extreme case of ‘no steering’,
subsidiarity and full responsibility for social actors result, though also
here the state may still engage in public campaigns (raising awareness),
codes of conduct, distribution of information and monitoring. In the case
of steering by comparison, adaptive target-setting (for example the
Lisbon goals) will have to be combined with the procedural rules of the
reflexive governance mode. For both alternatives, we will describe several
‘productive constraints’ (Streeck, 1992).
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In an adaptive setting, when the objectives and solutions of govern-
ment policy are known, the government can take effective action by
providing guarantees of consistency, condition-setting, competency and
consequences within an adaptive governance framework. This strategy is
similar to the ‘guidance, scope, results and accountability’ (‘richting,
ruimte, resultaat, rekenschap’) approach suggested by the SCP (2001).
Consistency relates to the clarity of the issue and the time-frame within
which a solution must be found. Condition-setting indicates the criteria
for judging whether a solution is acceptable or unacceptable.
Competency means recognizing the parties capable of bearing a share of
the responsibility for the development of a certain policy issue. Lastly,
consequences refer to how the success or failure of a particular approach
affects the parties involved.
If the nature of the issue and the potential solutions are not understood
or are controversial, and the external effects are modest, the government
may decide to invite social actors to define means and ends in more
reflexive and experimental settings. This gives the individual parties more
freedom to set their own policy targets, but at the same time, includes
stricter demands on their external and internal representativeness and
accountability. When the government steers by procedures, it must
ensure that the parties involved are of a sufficient quality and that the
decision-making process is not too non-committal and random in nature.
The regulatory measures tend to focus on new civil liberties, equal treat-
ment and anti-discrimination, guaranteeing the right to participate, indi-
vidual rights (voucher systems or social drawing rights) and conflict
management. The reflexive method puts priority on procedural justice,
guaranteeing the participation and codetermination rights of interested
parties, and setting up and monitoring conflict-management mechanisms.
The emphasis is on the right of participation, empowerment, process
monitoring and process conflict settlement. The concept of rights of
participation considers which parties could play a major role in the
decision-making process. Empowerment means that the parties are
granted the resources which they need to do their work properly. Process
monitoring means ensuring compliance with democratically legitimized
decision-making rules. Lastly, process conflict settlement provides rules
for resolving conflicts.
This brings us to the question of how other small, open economies
with corporatist arrangements are responding to common challenges
such as those discussed in this article. We suggest that our typology of
participation in government steering may be helpful to evaluate the
strategic response to both complex policy issues and the control of
external effects. We suggest that actors in general, if strategies and instru-
ments are carefully designed and monitoring is guaranteed, can experi-
ment with these alternatives in order to increase their ability to learn to
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coordinate their policies in an increasingly diverse and decentralized
economy. Lastly, a state actor which is accepted, predictable and trust-
worthy, yet capable of creating a credible threat or ‘shadow of hierarchy’
for the social partners and their negotiations, is a crucial asset, especially
in economies such as the Netherlands which combine collective with
decentralized bargaining.
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